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The ability to freely choose between different options for action is part of our understanding of 
ourselves as agents. Yet, there is ongoing debate as to whether we are in fact free to choose, and 
about what exactly free will consists in.  
In his engaging yet rigorous new book, Christian List takes on the challenge of defending free will.  
List argues that there are three conditions that need to be met in order for agents to have free will: 
they need to be able to act intentionally, there need to be genuinely open possibilities for action, 
and they need to be able to control their actions.  According to List, these requirements are 
threatened by three challenges: the requirement of intentional action is threatened by the challenge 
of eliminativism, the requirement of genuinely open possibilities is challenged by determinism, and 
the requirement of control is threatened by the acceptance of physicalism and the causal exclusion 
argument. He identifies a common thread running through these three challenges, in that all of 
them create problems for free will by focusing on the level of the physical system rather than the 
agential level (p.150).  
List’s defence of intentional action follows well established arguments against the reducibility of 
intentional explanations to explanations in terms of physiological processes. Following Dennett, 
Fodor and others, he argues that our best explanations of actions rely on the ascription of 
intentions, and that because these intentions are physically realised in multiple different ways, the 
physiological level is not suitable for explaining actions. The naturalistic ontological attitude holds 
that those entities that the best theory for explaining a phenomenon posits are real entities. If we 
accept this position, as List urges we should, we should also conclude that because we need 
intentions to explain actions, they are in fact real. 
Probably the most controversial and innovative argument of the book is List’s defence of 
indeterminism at the agential level. He labels his position compatibilist libertarianism, and argues 
that even if we accept determinism at the physical level, there are genuinely open possibilities for 
the agent at psychological/agential level. Many compatibilists do not require there to be genuinely 
open possibilities in the sense that an agent’s decision is not determined by prior events. Rather, 
they take it to be sufficient for free will and moral responsibility if agents’ decision making processes 
are causally relevant to the decision reached and the action performed. However, List takes the 
intuition that free will requires genuinely open possibilities as central to our concept of free will and 
sets out to defend it.  
How does this work? List once again makes central use of the concept of supervenience in his 
argument. If a property A supervenes on another property B, there can be no changes in A without 
there also being changes in B. However, it is possible that there can be changes in B without there 
being changes in A, because of multiple realisability. So, in the case of physical properties realising 
mental states, it is possible for two (or more) different physical states to realize one and the same 
mental state. This can lead to branchings at the agential level, where more than one outcome is 
possible given an initial psychological state of decision making – the agent can choose to have coffee 
or tea -  even when there can only be one possible sequence of events at the physical level. The 
reason for this is that what is one and the same state at the psychological level of description can be 
realised by different underlying physical states. Thus physical states B1 and B2 may both realise 
mental state A1. Because of determinism at the physical level, B1 and state B2 each only have one 
possible future outcome, B3 and B4 respectively. However, because B1 and B2 realise the same type of 
mental state A1, we can end up with A2 (realised by B3) or A3,  (realised by B4).  
This is a very clever and ingenious way of trying to introduce indeterminacy at the agential level. 
However, the incompatibilist may feel that some sleight of hand has taken place. Why is that? It 
seems that the indeterminacy that is introduced is only apparent and an artefact of the level of 
description. It isn’t really the case that at the point where an individual is in state A1, there is no fact 
of the matter as to whether they will be in A2 or A3 next. Rather, we do not know which one it will be 
when we look at the agential level. But if we were to look at the physical level, and if we were able 
to translate the physical state into the corresponding mental state, we would know what has to 
come next. List would agree that physicalism and supervenience together imply that the future is 
fixed, but would argue that if we take the independence of different levels of explanation seriously, 
then all the predictive and explanatory action takes place at the level of the mental. The schematic 
presentation of the supervenience relation may make it look like we could reduce mental state A1 to 
physical states B1 or B2, but the overall argument of the book is precisely that we can’t, and that a 
picture whereby one mental state can be neatly reduced to one of two distinct physical ones is 
overly simplistic. 
The importance of taking the separation of levels of explanation seriously is also central to List’s final 
argument for the causal relevance of mental states and decisions. The worry that List addresses here 
is that our mental states are mere epiphenomena, which do not do any causal work in our actions, 
because all the causal work takes place at the physical level. According to the causal exclusion 
argument, physicalism commits us to there being sufficient causes for action at the physical level, 
and this leaves no space for mental causes, as this would overdetermine an outcome. List once again 
argues that due to supervenience relations involving multiple realisability, it is often the higher level 
that we need to appeal to in order to get explanatory traction. He illustrates this point by using the 
example of boiling water breaking a bottle. Water boiling can be realised by different microstates of 
the water molecules, and each of these is sufficient but not necessary for the water boiling and the 
bottle breaking. The right level of explanation therefore refers to the boiling of the water, not to the 
ways in which this is realised by the microstates of the molecules. Similarly, the meat in action 
explanation is at the mental level of explanation, not at the level of physical realisation. 
List’s book is extremely well written and readable, but it covers a lot of very complex material 
drawing on debates in metaphysics, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This makes it 
very rewarding, and while he may not convince incompatibilists that the problem of combining 
determinism at the physical level with indeterminism at the agential level is resolved, he presents an 
intriguing case.  
 
